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I.  A NEW ERA OF LITIGATION 
After a three-week trial,1 the jury delivered its much-anticipated 
decision in only three days, taking the technology and legal worlds by 
storm.2  On August 24, 2012, a nine-member jury rendered a verdict of over 
one billion dollars for Apple in its high-profile patent litigation against 
Samsung.3  The jury was diverse but decidedly not a panel of patent experts: 
among the two women and seven men were a “social worker, an engineer[,] 
and an unemployed videogame enthusiast.”4  One juror had experience 
testing the quality of lunch boxes.5  Although one juror had experience with 
patent registration,6 the court dismissed another potential juror with actual 
patent experience.7  Of the nine jurors, only one had prior jury experience, 
and eight had no experience with the trial’s subject matter.8  However, the 
jury was not uneducated—six had college degrees.9  For such a high-profile 
technology trial, the jury was not terribly tech-savvy.10  In fact, only one 
juror owned an iPhone, and none owned a Samsung phone.11  In sum, the 
 
 1.  Heather Kelly, Apple and Samsung Make Final Cases to Jury in Patent Trial, CNN (Aug. 
22, 2012, 7:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/22/tech/mobile/apple-samsung-closing-
statements/index.html.  
 2.  Joanna Stern, Apple v. Samsung: Jury Rules for Apple, Recommends over $1 Billion in 
Damages, ABC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/apple-samsung-jury-
recommends-billion-damages-apple/story?id=17076455; see Brian X. Chen & Lisa Alcalay Klug, A 
Verdict that Alters an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/a-verdict-that-alters-an-industry.html (describing 
the impact of the verdict on the smartphone industry as a whole). 
 3.  Joel Rosenblatt, Samsung Claims Jury Foreman Misconduct Tainted Apple Case, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-03/samsung-
claims-jury-foreman-misconduct-tainted-apple-case.html. 
 4.  Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple v. Samsung: The Jury’s Hardship, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 
7:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444082904577607341919205050.html 
(access by Google title search; pasting the URL blocks the article by subscription requirement).  
 5.  Greg Sandoval, How Qualified Is the Apple–Samsung Jury? We Found Out, CNET (Aug. 
24, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57499944-37/how-qualified-is-the-apple-
samsung-jury-we-found-out/. 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Connie Guglielmo, At Apple–Samsung Trial, Jurors Selected After Being Asked to List Their 
Gadgets, FORBES (July 30, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2012/07/3
0/apple-samsung-trial-starts-with-jury-selection-still-underway/. 
 8.  Sandoval, supra note 5. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
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jury was composed of average people who, like the vast majority of 
Americans, had no prior experience adjudicating litigation.12 
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple v. Samsung)13 was, by 
any standard definition, complex.  The thirty-seven-page complaint alleged a 
variety of patent and trademark infringements.14  During trial, when the 
judge asked an attorney what identification number a newly admitted exhibit 
should receive, the attorney replied, “‘How about we give it one million?’”15  
At the end of the trial, the judge issued eighty-four esoteric jury instructions 
spanning 109 pages.16  Instructions in hand, the jury took only twenty-one 
hours of deliberation to answer over seven hundred questions necessary for 
the verdict.17  According to a popular legal blog, such a feat meant the jury 
was either brilliant enough to work at Google or too dull to understand the 
nuanced legal theories.18  Given the two options, the author said she was 
“going to vote for the latter.”19 
 
 12.  According to a 2008 poll, less than a quarter of all Americans have served on a jury.  See 
HARRIS INTERACTIVE, Just Under Three in Five Americans Believe Juries Can Be Fair and 
Impartial All or Most of the Time, FLA. JURY SELECTION BLOG (Jan. 22, 2008, 7:08 AM), 
http://www.juryblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/the-harris-poll-on-jury-duty.pdf. 
 13.  Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-01846 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011). 
 14.  Complaint, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-01846 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011), 
ECF No. 1, available at http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/110415samsungcomplaint.pdf. 
 15.  Vascellaro, supra note 4.  
 16.  See Final Jury Instructions, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-01846 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 21, 2012), ECF No. 1903. 
 17.  Elie Mystal, The Apple Samsung Verdict Is In, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 24, 2012, 6:09 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2012/08/apple-samsung-verdict/. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  Comments like these, which doubt whether average Americans can adjudicate difficult 
issues, are far from novel: one English lawyer called the jury trial the “‘high point of amateurism, 
potentially a recipe for incompetence and bias.’”  Jennifer Walker Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out?: A 
Case for the Continued Viability of the American Jury, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 303, 306 (2012) 
(quoting Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, A Judge Can Do the Work of 12 Amateurs, and Better, TIMES 
(London), Oct. 21, 2003, at 10). 
  The late twentieth century was rife with condemnations of juries in light of litigation’s 
growing complexity.  See, e.g., Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 
YALE L.J. 1155 (1980) [hereinafter The Case for Special Juries].  This is not to say that jury 
competence articles have ceased completely.  See, e.g., Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear 
Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0004.  Rather, existing literature has failed to 
adequately synthesize technology’s impact on learning and, by extension, its impact on jury 
competence in complex litigation.  This Comment seeks to do so. 
  There are legions of definitions of “complex litigation,” and the academy has not yet agreed 
on a definitive meaning.  Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 
DEPAUL L. REV. 49, 74 (1997).  This Comment adopts a general definition of “complex litigation”: 
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One major change has occurred since the advent of complex litigation: 
“[l]aw today has entered the technology age.”20  Certainly, technology was 
expanding in previous decades when complex litigation concerns were at 
their height, but this Comment looks at jury critiques from a new 
perspective: through the lens of the ubiquitous, 24/7 technology of the 
twenty-first century.21  The primary concern should not be with the fact that 
technology itself is changing; rather, it should be on how technology is 
altering the way young jurors process information.  This Comment argues 
for a comprehensive approach to legitimizing the lay jury—an approach 
involving education,22 attorney adaptation,23 courtroom renovations,24 and 
judicial knowledge25—and a better understanding of how legal professionals 
can fairly and most effectively transmit knowledge to the average 
American.26  The lay jury can remain a vital, unique part of the American 
judicial system if the bench and bar take seriously their responsibilities and 
adapt to today’s new reality.27 
Part II examines the background of three basic components of a 
successful contemporary trial: technology,28 litigation,29 and the jury.30  Part 
 
litigation involving occurrences or requiring evidence “beyond the experience of the typical lay 
jury.”  Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex Civil Litigation, 32 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 335, 336 (1999).  Though other definitions exist, this Comment employs a broad one due to 
its wide-ranging applicability to present and future technology-based litigation. 
  Complexity can apply to several elements of the litigation: the overall nature of the trial, the 
evidence presented, and the substantive law the jury must apply.  Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The 
Constitutionality of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 
883 (1998).  “[C]omplex litigation is arguably a macrocosm of individual litigation[, but] it presents 
an exponential increase in risk and potential complications.”  Richard Arsenault, et al., Settlement 
Strategies for Complex Global Litigation, TRIAL, Dec. 2007, at 40, 40 (Dec. 2007). 
 20.  Dwane L. Tinsley, The Use of Technology in the Courtroom, W. VA. LAW., Sept.–Oct. 2008, 
at 4, 4.  
 21.  See infra notes 114–30 and accompanying text (describing the rapid growth in technology 
use). 
 22.  See infra notes 376–84 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra notes 262–69 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See infra notes 157–63 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See infra notes 256–59 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See infra notes 362–75 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 325. 
 28.  See infra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text.  
 30.  See infra notes 65–105 and accompanying text. 
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III explores how these three components have evolved in the modern era.31  
Part IV analyzes how the components should be understood to maximize the 
legitimacy of lay juries.32  Part V notes probable future trends and offers 
suggestions for improvement.33  Part VI concludes.34 
II.  THE OLD FRAMEWORK 
Modern American complex litigation represents the synthesis of at least 
three factors, each of which has undergone massive changes throughout its 
history: technology, litigation, and juries.35  These three factors, while 
theoretically independent, become inextricably intertwined in the 
courtroom.36  With billions of dollars on the line and the world watching, the 
attorneys litigating Apple v. Samsung had to do more than simply know 
about these factors.37  Instead, they had to understand and exploit them for 
maximum juror understanding of complex subject matter.38  By doing so 
better than its adversary, Apple received $1 billion for its efforts.39  This 
section explores the background of each of these elements: first, 
technology;40 then litigation;41 and finally, juries.42  One theme rings 
throughout: the factors that characterize modern litigation were vastly 
different for the first two centuries of American litigation than they are 
now.43 
A.  Technology: Not Yet 
Technology—at least in the way we think of it today—had little impact 
 
 31.  See infra notes 111–203 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See infra notes 204–333 and accompanying text. 
 33.  See infra notes 334–84 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See infra notes 385–400 and accompanying text.  
 35.  Compare Part II with infra Part III.  
 36.  See infra notes 204–333 and accompanying text. 
 37.  See infra notes 362–73 and accompanying text (describing ways attorneys must adapt to 
technology).  
 38.  See infra notes 204–333 and accompanying text. 
 39.  See Rosenblatt, supra note 3.  
 40.  See infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
 41.  See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 42.  See infra notes 65–105 and accompanying text. 
 43.  Compare Part II with infra Part III.  
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on the juries of ancient Greece through colonial America for an obvious 
reason: it did not yet exist.  There were no multimedia PowerPoints, video 
depositions, or digital crime scene recreations.44  Instead, jurors evaluated 
oral evidence and arguments.45  Of course, the printing press brought literacy 
to the wealthy and educated men who served as jurors, especially by colonial 
times.46  However, the tradition of oral advocacy dominated.47  In colonial 
America, litigation was a crude dispensation of justice, often argued and 
decided by non-professionals.48  By one account, early litigation was simply 
two adversaries telling their sides of the story to a panel of judges who 
decided the case by drawing lots.49  Modern technology was slow to enter 
the courtroom—it was not until 1998 that a federal pilot program 
encouraged the use of technology in litigation.50 
B.  Litigation: Not Complex 
Though generalizing the first two millennia of litigation is impossible, 
several noteworthy themes exist.  First, early litigation was usually much 
shorter than it is today.51  Early English trials were often extremely short, 
with up to twenty-five trials occurring in a single day.52  By contrast, the 
 
 44.  Today’s use of technology in the courtroom is starkly different.  See infra notes 157–63 and 
accompanying text. 
 45.  See J. Bradley Ponder, Comment, But Look over Here: How the Use of Technology at Trial 
Mesmerizes Jurors and Secures Verdicts, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 289, 299 (2005).  Oral evidence 
seems more appropriate in a culture in which the main method of education is oral instruction.  See 
infra notes 224–31 and accompanying text (describing traditional verbal education’s impact on 
litigation).  Today, however, people “remember only 10% of what they hear, . . . but an astonishing 
65% of what they both see and hear.”  Charles Wright & Jenny Henszey, Electronic Media in the 
Modern Trial, ARK. LAW., Winter 2010, at 28, 28. 
 46.  See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 399, 432–33, 458–62 (1996).  Sixty percent of colonial American men were 
literate—a figure higher than their European counterparts.  Mary Sarah Bilder, The Lost Lawyers: 
Early American Legal Literates and Transatlantic Legal Culture, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 47, 55–
56 (1999). 
 47.  See Ponder, supra note 45, at 299. 
 48.  See Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 
347, 369 (2003). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See Ponder, supra note 45, at 290. 
 51.  Smith, supra note 46, at 405. 
 52.  Id. 
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average civil trial now takes three to four days.53  Second, jury trials were 
relatively simple.54  The rules of joinder codified in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure did not exist until 1938.55  Until then, judges—not juries—
heard suits involving several parties or issues.56  Complex litigation, with 
vast numbers of plaintiffs and causes of action being argued in front of a 
jury, simply did not occur.57  Third, courts were unlikely to compensate 
injured citizens.58  In the nineteenth century, “views and practices that held 
individuals accountable for their own personal injuries . . . dominated the 
legal and social terrain”; therefore, lawsuits were less prevalent.59  Finally, 
lawyers won trials through oral advocacy, with tradition demanding that 
“two orators stand juxtaposed to one another, and the more persuasive of the 
two w[on] the day.”60  Today, however, attorneys have more weapons in 
their persuasive arsenal.61  Without characterizing historical jury trials as 
quaint, it is important to recognize that lay juries simply did not decide 
complex, multifaceted cases the way they do today.62  Instead, wealthy, 
educated men relied on oral advocates to persuade them in cases that 
 
 53.  Michael L. Seigel, Pragmatism Applied: Imagining a Solution to the Problem of Court 
Congestion, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 595 (1994). 
 54.  See Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal 
Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 575, 582 (1990). 
 55.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20; see also Douglas King, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and 
the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 581–83 & n.7 (1984); see also 
id. at 606–07 & n.148 (discussing how the introduction of joinder altered the landscape of litigation). 
 56.  Sutton, supra note 54, at 582.  This is particularly compelling because, historically, juries 
were composed of the most educated of the populace.  See id. at 579–80.  If the most educated in 
society were deemed inadequate to adjudicate complex litigation, there has been an enormous shift 
from elitism to populist thinking in the past two hundred years.  Some point to this historical use of 
equity courts to suggest that there is no right to a jury trial in complex litigation today.  See id. at 
582; infra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 57.  See Sutton, supra note 54, at 582. 
 58.  See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1230–32 (2001); Robert L. 
Rabin, The Torts History Scholarship of Gary Schwartz: A Commentary, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 461, 
479–80 (2002); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A 
Reinterpretation, 90 Yale L.J. 1717, 1730–31 (1981); John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to 
Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of 
the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 719–20 (2000). 
 59.  Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 178–79 (1989). 
 60.  Ponder, supra note 45, at 299. 
 61.  See infra notes 157–63 and accompanying text. 
 62.  See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
[Vol. 41: 817, 2014] Complex Litigation in the New Era of the iJury 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
824 
involved relatively few issues.63  But times have changed—drastically.64 
C.  Juries: Not So Diverse 
Though the jury system dates back to at least ancient Greece,65 most 
academic discussion begins with sixteenth-century English juries because of 
their great influence on their colonial American counterparts.66  English and 
colonial American jurors had trial experience and specific knowledge of the 
issues to be litigated.67  In fact, they were chosen because of their special 
knowledge of the case.68  Like most groups that wielded any civil power at 
the time, the jury was composed of white, male property owners.69  
Commonly, these men were required to possess more than property to be 
eligible—they also needed a minimal level of intelligence.70  When John 
Adams described the jury as the “voice of the people,” he took care to define 
the “people” as not “the vile populace or rabble of the country, nor the cabal 
of a small number of factious persons,” but instead the “judicious part” of 
the citizenry.71  With all of these qualifications, early English and colonial 
juries were more similar to what today have been coined “special juries”: 
juries chosen from a select group of “qualified” citizens, rather than from a 
random selection of lay citizens.72  Lastly, the jury’s role was greater than it 
is today: it decided questions of both law and fact until 1895.73  
 
 63.  See supra notes 45–60 and infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See infra notes 131–71 and accompanying text.  
 65.  Elrod, supra note 19, at 310. 
 66.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 46, at 390 (“Since the modern American jury finds its roots in 
the early English jury, it is useful to study this institution in order to determine how the jury has 
evolved in America . . . .”). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Strier, supra note 19, at 58; Smith, supra note 46, at 399; see also James C. Oldham, The 
Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 164 (1983) (“Originally, jurors were presumed 
to know the facts in dispute because they were residents of the vicinity where the dispute arose.  The 
early statutes called for jurors who were ‘next Neighbours,’ those who ‘have best Knowledge of the 
Truth, and be nearest.’”). 
 69.  See Smith, supra note 46, at 399–400.  
 70.  See id. at 434.  Even when intelligence standards were not explicitly employed, the property 
qualifications certainly increased the chances of an educated jury.  Id. at 399. 
 71.  Id. at 432 (internal quotations and footnote omitted).  This is antithetical to modern concerns 
of cross-representation.  See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 72.  See generally Sutton, supra note 54; see also infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 73.  See, e.g., Sparf  v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 63–64, 69–70, 99–103, 106 (1895).  The 
decision to prevent jury determinations of law was an early example of the modern trend to decrease 
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Like many American institutions, the jury underwent dramatic changes 
in the twentieth century.74  Its demographics evolved “dramatically at a pace 
far exceeding the diversification of legislatures, executive branches, or the 
judiciary.”75  Though the Fifteenth Amendment technically opened voting—
and jury service—to African Americans in 1870,76 conservatives77 widely 
used Jim Crow laws and other techniques for almost a century to keep them 
off juries.78  Changes continued in 1920, when women gained the right to 
vote and, as a result, to serve on juries.79  In 1975, the Supreme Court’s 
 
jury power.  See infra notes 83–95 and accompanying text.  As the opening page of one textbook put 
it, “mistrust of juries is the single overriding reason” for modern jury-limiting laws.  CHRISTOPHER 
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 1 (7th ed. 2011). 
 74.  See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
 75.  Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the 
Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 326 (1995); see also id. at 326 n.5 (noting that as of 1988, 
women comprised only 7.4% of the federal judiciary). 
 76.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV; JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 189, 245 (5th ed. 2010).  “The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 77.  This is not to imply political conservatives.  Rather, I use a literal definition of conservative: 
“tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).  In this sense, conservatives are those in power (the bench, bar, and 
academy) who have no interest in changing power structures because they are already at the top.  See 
id.  For example, at the time, it was Southern Democrats who were, in this sense, “conservative”—
“unified in their desire to uphold segregation and to resist any threats to the Jim Crow South.”  Juan 
F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic 
Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L,J. 95, 102 (2011). 
 78.  See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 6–9 (2001) (“The phase that 
began in 1877 was inaugurated by the withdrawal of federal troops from the South[] [and] the 
abandonment of the Negro as a ward of the nation . . . .  [But] [i]n the early years of the twentieth 
century, it was becoming clear that the Negro would be effectively disenfranchised throughout the 
South, . . . that neither equality nor aspirations for equality in any department of life were for him.”); 
Pamela W. Carter & Phoebe A. Roaf, A Historic Overview of Brown v. Board of Education, 51 LA. 
B.J. 410, 412–13 (2004) (“[Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)] contributed to the enactment of 
Jim Crow laws prohibiting blacks from entering or utilizing public facilities . . . .  Brown, although 
momentous, proved to be merely another stepping stone in the lengthy struggle to achieve equality 
under the law for all citizens instead of a death knell for all segregation.”); Linda Greene, Jim 
Crowism in the Twenty-First Century, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 43, 46 (1998).   
  In fact, even today, studies suggest that some jurisdictions suffer from continued 
underrepresentation of African Americans on juries.  See Shaila Dewan, Study Finds Blacks Blocked 
from Southern Juries, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/02jury.html?pagewanted=all.  In one case, prosecutors used 
all of their peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors, leaving a jury composed of one black and 
eleven white jurors, even though the county in which the crime was committed was 45% black.  Id. 
 79.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; VILE, supra note 76, at 188, 198.  “The right of citizens of the 
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holding in Taylor v. Louisiana,80 that criminal juries must represent a cross-
section of society, further cemented jury diversification.81   
As the twentieth century progressed, conservatives bristled at the idea 
of—to quote John Adams—the “vile populace”82 gaining power in the legal 
realm.83  In response to expanding jury demographics, they used several 
strategies to reapportion power to those in the courtroom whose 
demographics remained stable (judges and lawyers).84  The first was the 
peremptory strike, which allows lawyers to dismiss a potential juror for no 
stated reason.85  Critics of the peremptory strike allege that “[t]hose persons 
in the venire who appear perceptive, well-educated, or independent-minded 
are in the most danger of being peremptorily struck,”86 but others have found 
no such result.87  In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codified a 
 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of sex.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 80.  419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
 81.  See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 82.  Smith, supra note 47, at 432 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). 
 
 83.  See Dooley, supra note 75, at 355–56.  
 84.  See id. at 355 (“The movement toward limiting jury power corresponds with the struggle of 
formerly excluded groups to gain access to jury service.”); see also Smith, supra note 46, at 385. 
 85.  The peremptory strike has long been a weapon in lawyers’ arsenals.  2 ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 384 (4th ed. 2012).  Though the Supreme Court 
has refused to recognize a constitutional guarantee to peremptory strikes, it has long acknowledged 
their essentiality in litigation.  Id.; see also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) 
(holding that the “making of [peremptory] challenges was an essential part of the trial, and that it 
was one of the substantial rights of the prisoner to be brought face to face with the jurors at the time 
when the challenges were made”).  However, the Supreme Court has held litigants may not use 
peremptory strikes on the grounds of race, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986), or 
gender, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991).  
 86.  Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 64 (2001).  
The well-educated are also more likely to be dismissed from the jury due to undue financial 
hardship, since they typically have the most money to lose by spending the day in the jury box 
instead of at work.  See id. at 62 & n.28.  Some suggest mitigating or eliminating the peremptory 
strike as one method of fostering a more educated jury.  See, e.g., Strier, supra note 19, at 74 
(warning that such mitigation would be met with strong resistance from lawyers, who, nonetheless, 
would retain unlimited challenges for cause).  
 87.  Hillel Y. Levin & John W. Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection 
Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325, 328 (2006) (writing that the results of studying Connecticut juries 
were “surprising: there is no evidence that juries are undereducated relative to the venires from 
which they are selected.  Indeed, juries seem to be better educated than the Connecticut population 
demographics reported by U.S. census data.  Thus, our study suggests that the system is not broken 
in the way we typically imagine”).  It is strange that, at some point, the peremptory strike shifted 
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second method of sapping jury power: the JNOV.88  By using the JNOV,89 
judges are able to “fix” unreasonable jury verdicts they find to be against the 
legally sufficient weight of the evidence.90  Another academically popular 
method of jury control is the special jury.91  For decades, the academy has 
pushed for special, or “blue ribbon,” juries composed of those it deems 
qualified to adjudicate complex litigation.92  For instance, a 1980 Yale Law 
Journal article advocated that “[a]ny party to a complex suit should be 
allowed to move for trial by a special jury . . . .  [A] complex antitrust action 
by one large corporation against another would seem perfectly suited to the 
use of a special jury.”93  A final strategy is to eliminate the jury altogether in 
favor of a bench trial,94 but this would almost assuredly run afoul of the 
 
from excluding minorities and other perceived underqualified jurors, see generally WRIGHT, supra 
note 85, to excluding, as critics allege, overqualified jurors, see Lilly, supra note 86 and 
accompanying text. 
 88.  Rule 50(b) states: 
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 
50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the 
court’s later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.  No later than 28 days 
after the entry of judgment—or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a 
verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint 
request for a new trial under Rule 59.  In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: 
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or 
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
 89.  JNOV, commonly called “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” is short for the Latin 
phrase “judgment non obstante veredicto.”  See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 369, 
375 (1913). 
 90.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 50; Dooley, supra note 75, at 333. 
 91.  Cries for special juries were especially loud in the 1980s after the surge of complex tort and 
technology litigation in the 1970s.  See generally, e.g., The Case for Special Juries, supra note 19. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 1172–73.  While there is not broad consensus on exactly how to compose special 
juries, one reasonable suggestion is for a majority of the jury to hold a college degree.  See Strier, 
supra note 19, at 58–60.  The Supreme Court has held that in criminal cases, the Constitution 
requires juries to be a “fair cross section of the community.”  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 
(1975).  While the Court has not squarely held whether civil cases require the same cross-section, 
see Sutton, supra note 54, at 581, some argue that a college-educated jury would pass constitutional 
muster because “today’s population of college graduates represent virtually every segment of 
society.”  Strier, supra note 19, at 63.  Furthermore, as long as the venire meets cross-section 
requirements, there is no law requiring that petit juries do so as well.  Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 
162, 174 (1986).  Therefore, if a college-educated jury pool represents the community as a whole, it 
might pass constitutional muster. 
 94.  See infra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
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Seventh Amendment’s guarantee to a civil jury.95 
The rationale underlying all of these power-shifting techniques is the 
same: the academy96 has insisted that the jury is incompetent to effectively, 
fairly, and objectively adjudicate complex litigation.  There are myriad 
denunciations of the ordinary American’s capacity to adjudicate today’s 
complex matters: that the assumption that juries understand instructions 
“seems highly artificial”;97 that there is “no constitutional or statutory right 
that ‘ignorance’ be represented in the jury box”;98 that there is no reason to 
“wait until the appellate level to have triers of fact that are prepared to 
render accurate and consistent verdicts”;99 that “[t]he only question is 
whether we can tolerate comprehension problems as the price for 
maintaining jury participation in resolving conflicts”;100 and that despite 
good intentions, “the cross-section requirement . . . serve[s] to decrease the 
competency of the jurors entrusted with deciding a case.”101  It seems that 
those at the top of legal structures have always distrusted juries—English 
kings threatened severe penalties for juries who handed down undesirable 
verdicts,102 and modern intellectuals continue to deride common citizens who 
give what they consider undesirable verdicts.103  Though the history of the 
jury has seen plenty of changes,104 the suspicion with which those in power 
 
 95.  See Strier, supra note 19, at 64.  Further, bench trials have not been found to produce better 
results than jury trials, at least in patent litigation.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and 
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 387–88, 408 n.155 
(2000). 
 96.  The academy’s critiques are in the same vein of conservatism referenced in supra note 77. 
 97.  Lilly, supra note 86, at 68. 
 98.  The Case for Special Juries, supra note 19, at 1171 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 
298 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99.  Miller, supra note 19, ¶ 42. 
 100.  Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 
DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 60 (1995). 
 101.  Steven L. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 
NW. U. L. REV. 190, 194 (1990). 
 102.  See Smith, supra note 46, at 408 (“[I]n the sixteenth century the courts in England possessed 
the power to set aside verdicts and punish jurors at will . . . .”); see also Elrod, supra note 19, at 312–
13 (“[J]uries even in early modern England could be punished for failing to reach the verdict desired 
by the government . . . .  In extreme cases, even death was an available penalty.”). 
 103.  See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.  In all fairness, the fact that those at the top 
of the legal power structure only critique juries instead of threatening them with jail time for being 
“wrong” shows a marked improvement in societal norms.   
 104.  See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.  
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view it has remained consistently high.105 
The ever-connected, technology-laden jury106 is a new phenomenon 
unknown to the traditional legal system.107  Historically, technology played a 
minimal role in predominantly oral trials.108  These trials were, by modern 
standards, short and simple.109  Privileged white males composed juries that 
wielded more power than they do today.110  Against this background, 
however, modern technology burst onto the scene. 
III.  TIMES ARE CHANGING 
A.  Technology: Proliferating 
One of the greatest changes since early jury competence literature lies in 
the realm of technology.111  Decades ago, when the academy was already 
plenty displeased with the average jury’s ability,112 few would be able to 
predict the proliferation of new technology and how soon much of it would 
be ubiquitously enmeshed in society.  Today’s world is far more 
interconnected and saturated with battery-powered gadgets than ever.113 
Americans have always loved their televisions, and “total TV viewing 
has been on the rise in the U.S. for years . . . .”114  Currently, 114.7 million 
households own televisions, and the average American watches an 
astonishing five hours of video every day, 98% of which is viewed from a 
traditional TV.115  That means that in a single year, the average American 
spends over seventy-six days sitting in front of a television.116  But the 
 
 105.  See supra notes 83–103 and accompanying text. 
 106.  See infra notes 182–203 and accompanying text. 
 107.  See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 108.  See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 109.  See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 110.  See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
 111.  See infra notes 117–30 and accompanying text. 
 112.  See, e.g., supra notes 91–93, 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 113.  See infra notes 114–30 and accompanying text. 
 114.  Brian Stelter, Nielsen Reports a Decline in Television Viewing, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2012, 
10:45 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/nielsen-reports-a-decline-in-
television-viewing/?src=tp. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See id. (five hours multiplied by 365 days per year equals 1,825 hours per year, or 76.04 
days). 
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television is no longer the only screen captivating Americans’ attention. 
Welcome to the era of the cell phone, and, increasingly, the 
smartphone,117 which is capable of accessing the Internet and running 
applications (apps).118  As of 2011, 83% of all American adults owned cell 
phones,119 and approximately one-third of Americans ages fourteen to 
seventeen owned smartphones.120  Proliferation of smartphones has 
contributed to an explosion of texting.121  While teenagers as a whole send an 
average of sixty text messages per day, fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds 
send one hundred per day.122  An even more poignant illustration of the way 
technology is replacing traditional modes of communication is the fact that 
about two-thirds of teenagers text every day, while only about one-third 
engage in daily face-to-face socializing outside of school.123   
Americans increasingly turn to omnipresent technology to thwart 
boredom.  Forty-two percent of cell phone owners use them for 
 
 117.  A smartphone is “a cell phone that includes additional software functions (as e-mail or an 
Internet browser).”  Smartphone Definition, MERRIAM–WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/smartphone (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).  CNN has 
devoted an entire series to the smartphone era.  See Mobile World Congress, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/tech/our-mobile-society/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 118.  An app is “a program ([sic]as a word processor or a spreadsheet) that performs one of the 
major tasks for which a computer is used.”  MERRIAM–WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60 (11th 
ed. 2003).  Along with Internet access and larger screens comes the ability for businesses to 
advertise.  “[T]he mobile ad market is embryonic, although growing rapidly.”  Steve Lohr, The 
Mobile Wave Rolls On, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct. 19, 2012, 12:15 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/the-mobile-wave-rolls-on/?_r=0.  Might mobile growth 
lead to additional privacy-centered litigation?  See Kevin J. O’Brien, Data-Gathering via Apps 
Presents a Gray Legal Area, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2012, at B7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/technology/mobile-apps-have-a-ravenous-ability-to-collect-
personal-data.html (highlighting privacy issues for apps that transfer personal data). 
 119.  AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICANS AND 
THEIR CELL PHONES 5 (2011), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2011/ 
Cell%20Phones%202011.pdf.  In Apple, eight of the nine jurors owned cell phones.  Sandoval, 
supra note 5. 
 120.  AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS, 
SMARTPHONES & TEXTING 3 (2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/ 
Reports/2012/PIP_Teens_Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf.  More than two-thirds of twenty-five to 
thirty-four year-old cell-phone owners have smartphones.  America’s New Mobile Majority: A Look 
at Smartphone Owners in the U.S., NIELSEN NEWSWIRE (May 7, 2012), blog.nielsen.com/ 
nielsenwire/online_mobile/who-owns-smartphones-in-the-us/. 
 121.  See infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 122.  LENHART, supra note 120, at 2. 
 123.  Id. 
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entertainment when they are bored.124  For Millennials,125 that figure 
escalates to 70%, with nearly half of them admitting they “have had trouble 
doing something because they did not have their phone nearby.”126  As of 
March 2012, 212 million Americans used the Internet.127  Ninety-two percent 
of all young adults, and virtually all college students, are online.128  Over half 
of young adults go online everyday “for no particular reason except to have 
fun or to pass the time.”129  In short, mobile technology has transitioned from 
being a luxury of the few to a common fact of everyday American 
existence.130  It should also transition legal professionals to a new way of 
looking at litigating in front of juries. 
B.  Litigation: Increasingly Intricate 
Since the mid-twentieth century, litigation has become significantly 
more complex131 due to several factors.  First, the introduction of the federal 
rules of joinder in 1938 allowed for multiple claims by multiple parties to be 
decided in a single lawsuit by a single jury.132  Second, the subject matter of 
litigation became much more intricate than in the past.  Many lawsuits began 
 
 124.  SMITH, supra note 119, at 2. 
 125.  See infra note 181. 
 126.  SMITH, supra note 119, at 2. 
 127.  May 2012—Top U.S. Web Brands and News Websites, NIELSEN NEWSWIRE (June 22, 2012), 
blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/may-2012-top-u-s-web-brands-and-news-websites/.  
Google was the most viewed website, while Facebook came in second.  Id. 
 128.  Aaron Smith et al., College Students and Technology, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT 
(July 19, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/07/19/college-students-and-technology/. 
 129.  Lee Rainie, The Internet as a Diversion and Destination, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET 
PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/12/02/the-internet-as-a-diversion-and-
destination/. 
 130.  As an example of the increasing accessibility of technology, the 1984 Apple iMac cost 
$662.35 per MHz of computing power; by 2009, consumers paid just $0.34 per MHz.  Mark J. Perry, 
Computers Just Keep Getting Cheaper and Better, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Apr. 7, 
2010), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2010/04/computers-just-keep-getting-cheaper-and-better-
and-we-should-eagerly-await-the-days-ahead/. 
 131.  See supra note 19. 
 132.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20.  The exponentially increased complexity these Rules allow 
prompted one commentator to write that the rules of liberalized joinder pit Fifth Amendment due-
process concerns against the Seventh Amendment, though the merits of that debate are beyond the 
scope of this Comment.  Roger W. Kirst, The Jury’s Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1982). 
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to center around novel and esoteric concepts: DNA,133 computers,134 
derivative securities,135 antitrust,136 and, as in Apple v. Samsung, software 
patents.137  Third, recent decades have seen juries hear an “explosion of 
patent litigation,”138 which is “inherently complex.”139  One federal district 
court judge commented: “Honest to God, I don’t see how you could try a 
patent matter to a jury.  Goodness, I’ve gotten involved in a few of these 
things.  It’s like somebody hit you between your eyes with a four-by-
 
 133.  DNA was first introduced to the criminal justice system in the mid-1980s.  Kathryn A. 
Harrington, Note, Ghosts of Innocent Men: Necessary Implications of Skinner v. Switzer, 38 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 331 (2012).  By the late 1980s, courts wrestled with DNA’s reliability as 
courtroom evidence.  See, e.g., People v. Castro, 540 N.Y.S.2d 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). 
 134.  One of the earliest computer litigation cases is Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University 
Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).  For more on computer copyright history, see 
Brian Johnson, An Analysis of the Copyrightability of the “Look and Feel” of a Computer Program: 
Lotus v. Paperback Software, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 961 (1991). 
 135.  The most famous derivative securities suit is likely Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) 
because of its famous “footnote 10,” which some have construed as allowing for a complexity 
exception to the right to trial by jury.  See infra note 151.  The suit focused on whether Lehman 
Brothers was unlawfully controlling another corporation.  Ross, 396 U.S. at 531–32.  In footnote 10, 
the Court listed three factors when discussing whether a jury should try particular issues.  Id. at 538 
n.10.  The third factor is “the practical abilities and limitations of juries.”  Id.  The ambiguous 
phrase, listed last in a series placed in a footnote, has led scholars to conjecture whether the Supreme 
Court tacitly approved of a complexity exception.  See infra note 151. 
 136.  See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 137.  Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-01846 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011). 
 138.  Edmund J. Sease, Ten Commandments of a Defendant’s Patent Case, in PATENT LITIGATION 
1993, at 603, 603 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. 
No. 375, 1993).  While in 1940, only 2.5% of patent cases in federal court went to juries, that figure 
catapulted to 59% by 1999.  Moore, supra note 95, at 366. 
 139.  Deborah M. Altman, Comment, Defining the Role of the Jury in Patent Litigation: The 
Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699, 699 (1997).  Complexity influenced the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that the construction of patents “is exclusively within the province of the court.”  
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).  The Court wrote: 
Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also 
play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of art. . . .  [T]he 
fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the 
issue in question. . . .  The construction of written instruments is one of those things that 
judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.  
Patent construction in particular is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special 
training and practice.  The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a 
proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to 
be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be. . . .  [T]he claims of 
patents have become highly technical in many respects . . . .  
Id. at 388–89 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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four.”140  Patents or otherwise, juries are required to understand increasingly 
complex subject matter.141 
Such complexity increases the cost of litigation and the scope of 
evidence.  Patent litigation very often costs each party more than $1 
million.142  Though not necessarily typical, document discovery involved 
3,000,000 pages in In re NASDAQ Market-Markers Antitrust Litigation.143  
Likewise, 577,000 pages were admitted into evidence in Cimino v. Raymark 
Industries, Inc.144  Even if the Cimino jury were comprised of solely Mensa 
members,145 it is hardly conceivable that they would be able to grasp over 
500,000 pages of documents. 
Since previous academic critiques of jury competence,  litigation has 
continued to evolve.146  The critiques from the 1980s are still present and, 
some would argue, more pronounced: “[M]odern trials and the jury selection 
process have coalesced to exacerbate traditional problems that have long 
been recognized.”147  In response to this perceived exacerbation, courts are 
taking measures to preserve the legitimacy of trials.148  One involves 
avoiding the jury;149 the other involves accommodating it.150 
The first response, avoidance, assumes that a “complexity exception” 
exists151 to the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury 
in civil cases.152  Some have used equitable and due process considerations 
 
 140.  Symposium, Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 
1145 (1993) (quoting Judge Alfred V. Covello, U.S. District Court Judge for the District of 
Connecticut). 
 141.  See supra notes 133–40 and accompanying text.  
 142.  Moore, supra note 95, at 367. 
 143.  187 F.R.D. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 144.  751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990). 
 145.  Mensa is a group dedicated to those whose IQ scores rank in the top 2% of the population.  
About Mensa International, MENSA, http://www.mensa.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 146.  See infra notes 147–71 and accompanying text. 
 147.  Lilly, supra note 86, at 53. 
 148.  See infra notes 151–63 and accompanying text.  
 149.  See infra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 150.  See infra notes 157–63 and accompanying text. 
 151.  The academy has long debated whether such an exception actually exists.  See supra note 
135.  Exception proponents claim that special juries are rooted in history and that incompetent lay 
juries raise due process concerns.  The Case for Special Juries, supra note 19, at 1163, 1170–72.  
Others offer what they believe to be sufficient suggestions for improving lay juries without replacing 
them with special jurors.  See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 101, at 209–18. 
 152.  “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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to argue that the most complex civil litigation should be taken away from the 
purview of a jury.153  Concerns of complexity, typified by Judge Covello’s 
statement above,154 led Pennsylvania to contemplate the idea of 
implementing a specialized jury-free commercial court,155 which is not 
unheard of—Delaware has a special chancery court dedicated to commercial 
matters.156 
The alternative response, accommodation, requires courts to finally 
embrace technology.  Though judges are notoriously averse to change,157 the 
1999 Federal Judicial Conference endorsed the use of courtroom 
technology,158 and as the price of mobile technology has dropped, more 
attorneys are using it.159  Affordability is not the only force propelling 
technology into the courtroom.  Indeed, technology has many advantages: 
expediting proceedings, keeping the jurors’ attention, increasing their 
comprehension, and preventing their boredom.160  By 2011, nearly half of 
attorneys used laptops in the courtroom,161 and jurors are virtually all in 
favor of courtroom technology.162  If both attorneys and jurors benefit from 
technology and it aids in juror comprehension, it is surely an effective means 
of maintaining the modern jury’s legitimacy and buttressing it against 
 
 153.  See generally The Case for Special Juries, supra note 19. 
 154.  See Judicial Panel Discussions on Science and the Law, supra note 140 and accompanying 
text. 
 155.  Paul Lansing & Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Commercial Litigation: A 
Comparative Law Perspective, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 121, 122, 135–37 (1991). 
 156.  Id. at 135.  The Delaware Chancery Court is strictly equitable, meaning that commercial 
matters in which the plaintiff seeks monetary damages may still be tried before a jury.  See id. at 
135–36. 
 157.  Judges’ tolerance of courtroom technology is “evolving”; they “tend to be[come] receptive” 
to it after seeing its advantages.  Ponder, supra note 45, at 289–90. 
 158.  ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY ON COURTROOM 
TECHNOLOGY 1 (2003), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CTtech03.pdf/$file/ 
CTtech03.pdf. 
 159.  Ponder, supra note 45, at 292. 
 160.  Longhofer, supra note 19, at 341. 
 161.  5 DAVID BOIES & STEPHEN ZACK, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL 
COURTS § 61.3 (3d ed. 2011).  A survey revealed that attorneys use their laptops for presentation 
purposes, litigation support, connecting with the court’s audio/visual system, online research, and 
email access.  Id.  
 162.  Frank Herrera, Jr. & Sonia M. Rodriguez, Courtroom Technology: Tools for Persuasion, 
TRIAL, May 1999, at 66, 68 (quoting John Selbak, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of 
Computer-Generated Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337, 359–60 (1994)). 
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academic criticism.163 
Technology not only helps lawyers inside the courtroom, it also aids 
reporters outside.164  The ease of technology and rise of instantaneous news 
allows reporters to cover sensational and important cases like never 
before.165  Even Supreme Court Justices are not impervious to media reports 
of their decisions.166  Finally, many litigants would rather stay out of the 
public microscope, lest a jury deem their actions illegal for the world to 
see.167  In sum, court proceedings are no longer impervious to technology’s 
ever-expanding impact.168 
As technology infiltrates the courtroom—at however slow a pace—we 
can expect the character of litigation to continue to evolve.169  Darwinian 
though it may be, those who evolve most quickly will likely not only 
survive, but walk away with tremendous verdicts.170  Just ask Apple.171 
 
 163.  See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 182–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 164.  See infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Consider, for example, the nonstop news coverage of the Casey Anthony murder trial, for 
which more than six-hundred press passes were distributed.  See T.L. Stanley, Casey Anthony 
Murder Trial Garners Extensive Media Coverage, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/06/entertainment/la-et-casey-anthony-trial-sidebar-20110706.  
Technology and instantaneous news also led to some botched media reports of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  See 
Katherine Fung & Jack Mirkinson, Supreme Court Health Care Ruling: CNN, Fox News Wrong on 
Individual Mandate, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/cnn-supreme-court-health-care-individual-
mandate_n_1633950.html. 
 166.  See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 144–45 (2007); id. at 145 (“Even 
[Justice Kennedy’s] memos to other justices . . . sometimes mention concerns about the public’s 
reaction to their decisions.”).  Justice Thomas is particularly disdainful of the press after a 
horrendous confirmation hearing.  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 39–41 (2008).  When seniority rules 
dictated that his seat be near the press section of the courtroom, he leaned back so far in his chair 
that Justice Breyer blocked his view of NPR’s Nina Totenberg—and her view of him.  Id. at 387.  
Justice Breyer readily admitted that judges “cannot help but be aware of the public mood. . . .  
Judges read the newspaper . . . .  They realize they can be wrong.  That is why they sometimes 
reconsider earlier decisions and, in rare cases, overrule them.”  STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR 
DEMOCRACY WORK 10 (2010). 
 167.  See Arsenault, supra note 19, at 40. 
 168.  See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text. 
 169.  See infra notes 220–80 and accompanying text (describing the likely direction of education 
and, therefore, of jury trials). 
 170.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 171.  Id. 
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C.  Juries: Evolving 
The United States “is now the only country in the world where the jury 
continues to play both a broad and a central role in the adjudicatory 
process.”172  One explanation is that the American jury is defined, in part, by 
its adaptability.173  Academics have long discussed how the jury’s 
demographics and role have adapted to various cultural and political 
eras174—and how those in power have countered with legal adaptations of 
their own175—but they have spilled little ink regarding how juries have 
changed in the twenty-first century.  Perhaps this is because the changes are 
less immediately noticeable.176  Recently, we have not seen the introduction 
of new races or genders into the jury as we did in the twentieth century.177  
However, equally radical changes are presently afoot, particularly among 
today’s youth.178  Today’s younger generations are vastly different from 
baby boomers,179 and they will likely respond to litigation differently than 
their parents and grandparents.   
While older jurors are certainly important right now,180 the future of 
juries—and the legal system—lies with Millennials.181  Ergo, any 
adaptations the legal system makes necessarily must take them into 
consideration.  Millennials are marked by several distinct characteristics.182  
 
 172.  Lilly, supra note 86, at 59.  In Europe, juries have been relegated mostly to the realm of 
serious criminal trials.  Id. 
 173.  Smith, supra note 46, at 424.  For further explication on the jury’s “protean [ability to] . . . 
adapt[] to the needs of changing times,” see Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes 
from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 619 (1993). 
 174.  See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
 175.  See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
 177.  See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
 178.  See infra notes 183–200 and accompanying text. 
 179.  See infra notes 183–200 and accompanying text. 
 180.  One study of two Florida venires found the average juror to be forty-nine years old.  
Shamena Anwar et al., The Role of Age in Jury Selection and Trial Outcomes 10 (Econ. Research 
Initiative at Duke (ERID), Working Paper No. 146, 2013), available at 
http://heinz.cmu.edu/ShamenaAnwar/index_files/Anwar_age.pdf. 
 181.  In addressing the contemporary characteristics and changing nature of juries, this Comment 
focuses predominantly on “Millennials”: the generation born between 1980 and 1994.  See Scott 
Carlson, The Net Generation Goes to College, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 7, 2005, at A34, 
available at http://www.msmc.la.edu/include/learning_resources/todays_learner/The_Net_ 
Generation.pdf.  Therefore, as of 2012, all Millennials are eligible for jury service. 
 182.  See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.  
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They “expect results immediately” and “carry an arsenal of electronic 
devices.”183  They are more educated than their parents,184 expect to make 
more money, multitask, want to learn only what they have to learn, and do 
so in a style that is best for them.185  Teachers often bemoan their inability to 
hold students’ attention for even the shortest periods of time.186  Millennials 
are known for their short attention spans, in part, opined one teacher, 
“because of the media that . . . teachers and parents have encouraged them to 
spend their time with, and in part because we haven’t taught them to have 
longer attention spans.”187  Students rarely afford professors their undivided 
attention; “[i]nstead, they must learn to selectively focus when critical 
material is being discussed . . . .  The juror’s role is analogous.”188 
Today’s (and tomorrow’s) jurors also consume incredible amounts of 
media—both television189 and Internet190—which has changed the way they 
process information.191  For instance, the twenty-four-hour news cycle has 
turned news into fast-paced bullet points.192  When it comes to learning the 
 
 183.  Carlson, supra note 181, at A34. 
 184.  Id.  The education level of juries has been a hot topic among the highly educated academy.  
See Levin & Emerson, supra note 86, at 327.  Compare generally Lilly, supra note 86, with Levin & 
Emerson, supra note 87.  While many suspect that the most educated are barred from participation 
via peremptory challenges, see Lilly, supra note 86, at 64, at least one study has disproven this fear, 
see Levin & Emerson, supra note 87, at 328. 
 185.  Carlson, supra note 181, at A36. 
 186.  See id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Strier, supra note 19, at 71.  Naturally, this leads to the question: What is “critical material” 
in a trial?  Do jurors, like modern students, mentally calculate what will be “on the exam,” that is, 
what is necessary for them to arrive at a proper conclusion? 
  It is not clear that technology’s role in American education is as efficacious as it could be.  
See Pisa Envy, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19–25, 2013, at 61–62, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21569689-research-comparing-educational-
achievement-between-countries-growing-drawing.  A recent report ranked the United States 
seventeenth in overall education.  Id.  The top-ranked countries “differ widely in their approach” 
toward funding and implementing education.  Id. at 62.  Though education’s exact effect on jury 
competence is difficult to compare since so few countries use juries, continued poor education 
seemingly would not bode well for the lay jury’s future. 
 189.  The average American watches over thirty hours of television per week.  See Stelter, supra 
note 114. 
 190.  Internet users scroll through pages at a rate of about one per minute.  May 2012—Top U.S. 
Web Brands and New Websites, supra note 127. 
 191.  See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See Ponder, supra note 45, at 292; Liane Hansen, The Power of the 24-Hour News Cycle, 
NPR (May 29, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4671485 
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news of the day, the thirty-minute nightly news programs now seem 
impossibly long.193  Although thirty minutes might be too long for news, it is 
not too long for the popular phenomenon of legal dramas.194  One of the 
most popular, Law & Order, premiered in 1990195 and led to myriad 
spinoffs.196  In fact, by 2005, seven of the top twenty TV shows “were 
premised on forensic investigations and courtroom dramas,” meaning that 
more than 120 million Americans (many of them potential jurors) watched 
shows based heavily on litigation.197  Although these shows are entertaining, 
they present a false picture of what happens in both the laboratory and 
courtroom.198  Because they invariably resolve with successful DNA matches 
and forensic breakthroughs, jurors tend to believe forensic evidence is 
infallible.199  The increase in courtroom dramas may contribute to the decline 
in jury knowledge of real-life litigation and lead to more evidentiary 
problems by promulgating false information.200  
As jurors continue to evolve, and as Millennials occupy more and more 
seats in the jury box, the influence of technology will only increase.201  It 
will change the way children grow up, students learn, and lay citizens 
 
(“[Cable news] give[s] you brief bursts of updates.”). 
 193.  Since 1980, the three major network newscasts have lost over half of their viewership.  
Emily Guskin & Tom Rosenstiel, Network News: The Pace of Change Accelerates, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR.’S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM (2012), http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/network-
news-the-pace-of-change-accelerates/. 
 194.  See Rocky Salmon & Pat O’Brien, Jurors Tuning in to TV’s Influence; Popular Crime and 
Forensics Programs Are Changing Courtroom Perceptions, Lawyers Say, PRESS ENTER. (Riverside, 
Cal.), May 1, 2005, at A1. 
 195.  Law & Order, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098844/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 196.  Salmon & O’Brien, supra note 194.  The most popular spinoff, Law & Order: SVU, 
continues to be broadcast.  See Sam Schechner, NBC Cancels ‘Law & Order’ After 20 Seasons, 
WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034 
60404575244433956617448.html 
 197.  Salmon & O’Brien, supra note 194. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its Impact and Potential Concerns, 41 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 471, 475–77 (2007). 
 200.  See id. at 486–87 (“Forensic science crime dramas may exacerbate the incompetency issue.  
These shows have ignited an unprecedented interest in forensic science at all levels of education.”  
However, “the present percentage of questionably trained forensic examiners may pale in 
comparison to the next generation . . . .  This in turn will presumably result in more errors, more 
missed opportunities of justice, and more convictions and death sentences being overturned.”). 
 201.  See infra notes 241–49 and accompanying text. 
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perceive litigation.202  Only those attorneys savvy enough to understand the 
jury’s changing dynamics will find themselves consistently successful in 
tomorrow’s complex litigation.203 
IV.  A NEW REALITY 
A.  Technology: A Good Thing? 
It is undisputed that technology is proliferating.204  Put one way, “‘[w]e 
will think with, think into, and think through our smart tools.’”205  More 
prone to debate, however, is the extent to which this proliferation is 
beneficial.206  Technology experts are split on the issue.207  Proponents 
emphasize that the next generation will be “nimble, quick-acting 
multitaskers”208 who will develop the future’s most valued skills: “‘rapidly 
searching, browsing, assessing quality, and synthesizing . . . vast quantities 
of information.’”209  In complex litigation involving voluminous discovery, 
rapid search and synthesis skills could prove to be a distinct advantage for 
both lawyers who present the information and juries who evaluate it.210 
Others view technology with greater caution.211  This new way of 
constantly networked living “will drive [young people] to thirst for instant 
gratification, settle for quick choices, and lack patience.”212  If true, this 
 
 202.  See supra notes 183–98. 
 203.  See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 204.  See supra notes 111–30 and accompanying text. 
 205.  JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
PROJECT, MILLENNIALS WILL BENEFIT AND SUFFER DUE TO THEIR HYPERCONNECTED LIVES 5 
(2012), available at  http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Future_of_ 
Internet_2012_Young_brains_PDF.pdf.  “‘[B]ut their presence and reach into our lives will be less 
visible.’”  Id. 
 206.  See infra notes 207–18 and accompanying text. 
 207.  ANDERSON & RAINIE, supra note 205, at 2.  It is likely, however, that time will lead to 
greater consensus on the need for adaptation.  
 208.  Id.  There is now even evidence of “supertaskers”—those who “can handle several 
complicated tasks well.”  Id. at 3 (citing communications expert Stowe Boyd). 
 209.  Id. at 4 (quoting principal Microsoft researcher Jonathan Grudin). 
 210.  See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 211.  See infra notes 212–18 and accompanying text. 
 212.  ANDERSON & RAINIE, supra note 215, at 2.  The new “‘cognitive challenge’” for today’s 
youth is “‘integrity, the state of being whole and undivided.’”  Id. at 5 (quoting Barry Chudakov).  
Maintaining presence, mindfulness, and awareness in the face of persistent and pervasive 
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could prove to be disastrous for jurors in complex litigation, where decisions 
must be made methodically,213 and patience is at a premium.214  Soon, the 
skill of critically reading one thing and concentrating on it extensively will 
not necessarily be completely useless, “‘but it will be of far less consequence 
for most people.’”215  If the next generation is trained in skills devoid of 
sustained critical thinking, difficulty in adjudicating complex cases seems 
unavoidable.216  Nicholas Carr provides one final premonition about the 
scatterbrained jurors of tomorrow: “When we go online, we enter an 
environment that promotes cursory reading, hurried and distracted thinking, 
and superficial learning.”217  The Internet might provide easy access to 
mountains of information, but “it is turning us into shallower thinkers, [and] 
literally changing the structure of our brain[s].”218  Technology’s complete 
impact remains to be seen, but the trend away from prolonged concentration 
and toward cursory analysis necessitates that the academy, judges, and 
attorneys begin thinking now about what that impact might be—and what 
they should do about it.219 
B.  Litigation: Behind the Times? 
1.  Litigation Must Follow Educational Trends 
The advent of ubiquitous technology220 and speculation about its impact 
 
connectivity will be highly sought after skills.  Id.  These are precisely the skills jurors will need to 
effectively adjudicate long, complex trials.  See supra notes 131–71 and accompanying text 
(describing modern changes in litigation). 
 213.  This is particularly true when the jury needs to fill out a step-by-step special verdict form.  
See generally Shaun P. Martin, Rationalizing the Irrational: The Treatment of Untenable Federal 
Civil Jury Verdicts, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 683 (1995) (thoroughly describing the use of special 
verdicts). 
 214.  Patience is much more important with the length of today’s trials compared to their 
historical counterparts.  See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 215.  ANDERSON & RAINIE, supra note 205, at 4 (quoting Jonathan Grudin). 
 216.  See infra notes 290–92 and accompanying text (describing how even higher education did 
not yield greater juror understanding).  
 217.  Nicholas Carr, The Web Shatters Focus, Rewires Brains, WIRED MAG. (May 24, 2010, 
12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/05/ff_nicholas_carr/. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  See infra notes 220–80 and accompanying text (analyzing probable changes in litigation).  
 220.  See supra notes 111–30 and accompanying text. 
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on our futures221 lead to another debate with direct bearing on future 
litigation: how technology will affect education.222  The answer affects not 
only how professors should teach their students, but also how lawyers 
should communicate with juries.223  The courtroom and classroom share 
numerous similarities, and what happens in the classroom necessarily 
impacts courtroom strategies.224  The basic structure, purpose, and methods 
of the university have remained strikingly static over the course of its 
twelve-century existence: “Other than adding books, electricity, and women, 
it is still primarily an older person lecturing to a set of younger ones.”225  
Similarly, for all the change the courtroom has undergone, its fundamental 
modus operandi has remained static.226  A lawyer still stands before jurors 
and relies heavily on oratory to persuade them.227  The emphasis on oral 
communication has been one of the strongest common analogies between 
the classroom and courtroom.228  Until recently, the American education 
system has trained students to learn by in-person verbal instruction.229  
 
 221.  See supra notes 205–18 and accompanying text. 
 222.  “[E]ducation is one of the areas most heavily impacted by technology.”  How Technology 
Changes Everything (and Nothing) in Psychology: 2008 Annual Report of the APA Policy and 
Planning Board, 64 AM. PSYCH. 454, 455–56 (2009) [hereinafter How Technology Changes 
Everything].   
 223.  See infra notes 225–31 and accompanying text. 
 224.  See infra notes 225–31 and accompanying text. 
 225.  JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 
THE FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION: EXPERTS EXPECT MORE-EFFICIENT 
COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTS AND NEW GRADING SCHEMES; THEY WORRY ABOUT MASSIVE 
ONLINE COURSES, THE SHIFT AWAY FROM ON-CAMPUS LIFE 7 (2012) [hereinafter FUTURE IMPACT 
OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION] (internal quotation marks 
omitted), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Future_of_Higher_Ed.
pdf. 
 226.  See Gail A. Jaquish & James Ware, Adopting an Educator Habit of Mind: Modifying What It 
Means to “Think Like a Lawyer,” 45 STAN. L. REV. 1713, 1721–22 (1993) (suggesting that attorneys 
need to adapt to new methods of learning and expand beyond traditional verbal communication).  
 227.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 228.  Compare supra note 60 and accompanying text, with supra note 225 and accompanying text.  
 229.  See FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225, at 3 (“[T]he 
standardized knowledge-transmission model is primarily the same today as it was when students 
started gathering at the University of Bologna in 1088”).  Jeff Jarvis summed it up this way: 
[O]ur current educational system, start to end, is built for an industrial era, churning out 
students like widgets who are taught to churn out widgets themselves.  That is a world 
where there is one right answer: We spew it from a lectern; we expect it to be spewed 
back in a test. 
Id. at 5.   
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However, “[e]xperimentation and innovation are proliferating” in the 
classroom.230  Courtrooms should similarly adapt to new learning styles or 
risk impeding juror competence.231 
If education experts can accurately predict how future students will 
learn, legal professionals can more effectively adapt future litigation to 
maximize juror understanding.232  The Pew Research Center recently asked 
experts to speculate on the state of higher education in the year 2020.233  
Those who predict dramatic changes outnumbered those who predict relative 
stasis nearly two-to-one.234  The experts holding the less popular view 
contend higher education is “‘one of the most resistant social institutions 
ever created,’”235 in part because “[a]ll learning is not reducible to sound 
bytes, video clips, and PowerPoint graphics.”236  They claim the educational 
system is too large and cumbersome to quickly adapt to changing technology 
and learning preferences.237  Finally, they insist the purpose of higher 
education is not simply to impart knowledge, but rather to “develop [people] 
as social beings, in some quite specifically institutional ways” the Internet 
cannot do.238  If these experts are correct, students will continue to be trained 
to learn through the traditional oral lecture—which closely resembles how 
attorneys teach jurors239–and courts will have fewer fundamental shifts to 
which they need to adapt.240 
 
 230.  Id. at 3. 
 231.  See generally Jaquish & Ware, supra note 226. 
 232.  See infra notes 233–49 and accompanying text (summarizing current predictions on 
technology’s impact on future education).  
 233.  FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225. 
 234.  Id. at 3–4. 
 235.  Id. at 7 (quoting Hugh F. Cline). 
 236.  How Technology Changes Everything, supra note 222, at 456. 
 237.  See FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225, at 7.  
Similarly, courts have been long criticized for their cumbersome inability to keep up with modern 
trends and needs.  See, e.g., Laura Whitney Lee, Comment, Silencing the “Twittering Juror”: The 
Need to Modernize Pattern Cautionary Jury Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic 
Age, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 204–15 (2010); Eric P. Robinson, The Wired Jury: An Early 
Examination of Courts’ Reactions to Jurors’ Use of Electronic Extrinsic Evidence, 14 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 131, 145–47, 187–90 (2012). 
 238.  FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225, at 7 (quoting 
Matthew Allen). 
 239.  See supra notes 225–31 and accompanying text. 
 240.  Logically, if jurors are raised in schools that train them to learn verbally, traditional verbal-
based litigation should pose fewer problems going forward.  But see infra notes 241–49 and 
accompanying text (suggesting this optimism is unwarranted). 
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However, the three-fifths of survey respondents who predict 
extraordinary changes in education are likely correct.241  Simply put, bricks 
will be replaced by clicks.242  Demand for traditional lecture-based education 
will decrease,243 and, because of its cost,244 “[t]raditional face-to-face higher 
education will become a privilege of a few . . . .”245  Higher education, these 
experts say, simply must change.246  Technology is pervading students’ lives 
so much that concentration is giving way to stimulation, and cognitive effort 
is yielding to instant gratification.247  Technology is pervading children’s 
homes248 and their classrooms.249  If litigators ignore the reality that 
tomorrow’s jurors increasingly crave instant gratification without being 
trained to exert sustained focus for long periods of time, academic critics of 
lay juries might very well be correct. 
2.  Litigation Must Keep Up with Technology 
If education must change in the wake of ubiquitous technology (as most 
 
 241.  See FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225, at 4; infra 
notes 242–49 and accompanying text.  
 242.  See FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225, at 6–7.  The 
Economist claims this is already happening, with 30% of American college students taking at least 
one online course in 2011.  Higher Education: Not What It Used to Be, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1–7, 2012, 
at 30, [hereinafter Not What It Used to Be], available at http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21567373-american-universities-represent-declining-value-money-their-students-not-what-it.  
Massive open online courses (MOOCs) are gaining in popularity, in large part due to the flexibility 
they offer students and their relatively miniscule tuition fees compared to traditional universities.  Id. 
 243.  FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 225, at 4 (citing Alex 
Halavais). 
 244.  See id. at 5 (citing Donald G. Barnes).  The cost of higher education has ballooned at nearly 
five times the rate of inflation over the past thirty years, and student debt has doubled since 1997.  
Not What It Used to Be, supra note 242, at 29. 
 245.  FUTURE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 247, at 5 (quoting 
Tapio Varis) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 246.  Id. at 4 (citing Charlie Firestone). 
 247.  Matt Richtel, Technology Changing How Students Learn, Teachers Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/education/technology-is-changing-how-students-
learn-teachers-say.html?pagewanted=all  
 248.  Steve Kastenbaum, Helping Kids Cross the Digital Divide, CNN RADIO (Oct. 5, 2012, 
10:27 AM), available at cnnradio.cnn.com/2012/10/05/helping-kids-cross-the-digital-divide/.  
Though it would seem that children from lower-income households might suffer from “digital 
inequality,” ubiquitous technology seems to transcend economic status.  Id.  However, there is a 
“huge gap in knowledge of how to use that technology.”  Id. 
 249.  See, e.g., Higher Education: Not What It Used to Be, supra note 242. 
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believe),250 so too must litigation.251  The responsibility for jury preservation 
should fall on the bench and bar.252  First, as law student Laura Lee recently 
wrote, judges must solve the problem of the “twittering juror.”253  Jurors’ 
“digital misadventures,” such as tweeting during deliberations and Googling 
outside information, threaten to undermine the legitimacy of trials.254  To 
that end, jury instructions need to be more explicit: “[O]ld cautionary 
prohibitions—such as barring jurors from ‘outside research’ or ‘external 
discussion’—are no longer specific enough”255 for Millennials who may not 
even realize that the current instructions apply to social media.256  Because 
judges and their courtroom rules are not keeping up with technology,257 jury 
critics gain increasingly more fodder as misconduct is unveiled.258  While a 
complete technology ban “is not the wisest approach”259—it will likely cause 
unnecessary frustration260—uniform, specific instructions tailored to 
 
 250.  See supra note 234 and accompanying text.  
 251.  See infra notes 252–69 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 253.  See generally Lee, supra note 237. 
  “Twittering” is a reference to the social media application “Twitter,” which is a “real-time 
information network that connects you to the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news . . . .  At the 
heart of Twitter are small bursts of information called Tweets.  Each Tweet is 140 characters long . . 
. .”  Twitter, UNIV. OF WIS. RIVER FALLS, http://www.uwrf.edu/StudentAffairs/SocialMedia/ 
Twitter.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 254.  See Lee, supra note 237, at 182–83; see also Grant Amey, Comment, Social Media and the 
Legal System: Analyzing Various Responses to Using Technology from the Jury Box, 35 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 111, 124 (2010) (“[T]he problem of jurors’ misuse of technology looms large and shows no 
sign of decreasing.”).  In Apple, the trial judge specifically asked the jurors about their social media 
habits.  Sandoval, supra note 5.  The results: six used Facebook, one Tweeted, and no one blogged.  
Id. 
 255.  Lee, supra note 237, at 183. 
 256.  Id. at 195 (“Jurors’ insatiable appetite for immediacy clouds their sense of propriety.” 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
 257.  Only about 6% of the bench and bar tweet, id. at 184, so it is no wonder that judges have not 
incorporated social media-specific jury instructions. 
 258.  See id. at 184–86. 
 259.  Id. at 206.  
 260.  Consider New Yorkers’ reaction to the loss of power after Hurricane Sandy in October 2012.  
The New York Times ran several articles about citizens’ “separation anxiety” when they could no 
longer remain digitally connected at all times.  See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, How New Yorkers 
Adjusted to Sudden Smartphone Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Nov. 3, 2012, 9:33 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/how-new-yorkers-adjusted-to-sudden-smartphone-
withdrawal/?hp (“Not having hot water is one thing . . . .  But not having a phone?  Forget about it.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Aimee Lee Ball, Hurricane Sandy Reveals a Life 
Unplugged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at ST1, available at 
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technology-savvy jurors are vital.261 
Second, litigation’s increasing complexity demands that lawyers 
competently use the Federal Rules, jury instructions, and technology to 
create the most comprehension-friendly environment.262  A lawyer’s job is 
“‘to make . . . [jurors] understand, and if he has not achieved that objective, 
he has failed, not the jury.’”263  Perhaps the academic critique is misplaced—
maybe we should be focusing on attorney, rather than juror, competence.264  
At least one writer thinks so, asserting that the Model Rules for Professional 
Responsibility should reflect attorneys’ obligation to be at least minimally 
competent in using courtroom technology.265  The use of courtroom 
technology is becoming standard practice in today’s courtroom, so the 
Model Rules (or at least their comments) should address lawyers’ ethical 
obligations pursuant to this new reality.266  This makes complete sense.  If 
lawyers must be minimally competent in filing motions and presenting 
cogent arguments to the jury,267 there is no reason to resist extending 
minimal competence to something that will eventually be just as common as 
paperwork or oral arguments.268  After all, lawyers are the professionals, not 
jurors.  Academic critics should expect more of those who have dedicated 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/fashion/hurricane-sandy-reveals-a-life-
unplugged.html?src=dayp&_r=0 (“For a swath of teenagers and preteens on the East Coast, the 
power failures that followed Hurricane Sandy . . . represented the first time in their young lives that 
they were totally off the grid, without the ability to text, play Minecraft, video-chat, check Facebook, 
or send updates to Twitter.”). 
 261.  See Lee, supra note 237, at 205–06.  Repetition of cautionary instructions against prohibited 
technology use “is warranted.”  Id. at 218.  Attorneys can also access potential jurors’ social media 
pages during voir dire to determine the likelihood that they will wrongfully use technology during 
the trial and deliberations.  Id.  Simply identifying “the serious bloggers and tweeters [and] the 
veteran Internet surfers” is likely insufficient; rather, attorneys must ask more expansive questions to 
ensure a fair trial.  Amey, supra note 254, at 128. 
 262.  See infra notes 263–69 and accompanying text. 
 263.  Friedland, supra note 101, at 212. 
 264.  See Michelle L. Quigley, Courtroom Technology and Legal Ethics: Considerations for the 
ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, 20 PROF. LAW. 18, 20 (2010) (“[T]he Commission should 
consider, first, whether lawyers have an ethical obligation to be minimally competent in the use of 
courtroom technology . . . .”). 
 265.  See id. 
 266.  See id. 
 267.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 268.  See Quigley, supra note 264, at 20. 
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their lives to litigation than of jurors temporarily called away from their 
daily lives to serve on a single trial.269 
The introduction of technology into the courtroom is beneficial,270 
especially in light of technology’s increasing role in education,271 but it is not 
without its dangers.  First, while attorneys are adapting to technology,272 
judges lag well behind the general populace in their technology use.273  Until 
they get up to speed, they are unlikely to appreciate new courtroom uses for 
technology or to effectively combat jurors’ “digital misadventures.”274  
Second, it is possible that litigants might use increasingly advanced 
technology to mislead jurors.275  For instance, defense teams are using 
neurotechnology to explain away any and every criminal action.276  But 
perhaps jurors’ technological understanding will outpace that of lawyers, or 
maybe the jury will reject “junk science”277 based on its collective common 
sense.278  Based on current statistics,279 it is likely that tomorrow’s jurors—
who have grown up with technology—will be competent to judge 
technological evidence for themselves.280 
C.  Juries: Legitimate? 
Attorney competence aside, academics have long focused their concerns 
on juries.281  This section explores questions surrounding the merits of two 
 
 269.  See id. 
 270.  See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text.  
 271.  See supra notes 242–49 and accompanying text. 
 272.  See supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text. 
 273.  See Lee, supra note 237 and accompanying text.  Similarly, Justice Souter famously did all 
of his work only in fountain pen, eschewing technology altogether.  TOOBIN, supra note 166, at 51. 
 274.  See Lee, supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 275.  See Sease, supra note 138, at 621. 
 276.  Steve Fleming, Was It Really Me? AEON MAG. (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.aeonmagazine.com/being-human/steve-fleming-neuroscience-crime/.  
 277.  See Sease, supra note 138, at 621. 
 278.  The Supreme Court seemingly views jurors as having more common sense and sympathy 
than judges.  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“If the defendant preferred the 
common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the 
single judge, he was to have it.”). 
 279.  Compare supra note 257 and accompanying text with supra notes 117–23 and 
accompanying text. 
 280.  See infra notes 314–23 and accompanying text. 
 281.  See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.  This finger pointing at jurors might be 
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specific critiques in light of the recent technology revolution: first, whether 
juries are competent to adjudicate complex litigation;282 and second, whether 
the traditional advantages to jury trials still apply in the modern era.283 
1.  Competence 
Whether the jury is competent to evaluate mountains of evidence over 
the course of weeks or months and arrive at a fair and correct verdict is a 
matter that divides legal observers.284  Many authors decry juries as inept285 
and biased,286 while others defend them as perfectly adequate.287  This 
section wades through the arguments with an eye toward how modern 
technology strengthens or weakens certain assertions.288 
 
because many writers in the legal academy are lawyers who do not want to blame themselves for 
contributing to the perceived problem of jury incompetence. 
 282.  See infra notes 284–341 and accompanying text. 
 283.  See infra notes 324–31 and accompanying text. 
 284.  See infra notes 285–341 and accompanying text.  
 285.  See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.  “Trial lawyers warn . . . that the broader 
story often matters as much as evidence in complex patent cases.  ‘The winning party is usually the 
side that convinces the jury that they have been wronged . . . .’”  Vascellaro, supra note 4. 
 286.  Authors like Edmund Sease emphasize overwhelming juror bias against corporations, saying 
that 89% of jurors think large corporations “will use unfair tactics to squeeze out a small 
competitor.”  Sease, supra note 138, at 608.  Nearly just as many think corporations “take advantage 
of independent investors.”  Id.  They also tend to hold the Patent Office “in very high regard” and 
“have a natural and very dangerous instinct to make device-to-device comparisons . . . .”  Id. 
  Because jurors are prewired to dislike corporate patent holders, Sease encourages 
corporations to use expert witnesses wisely:  “Your expert will look, act, dress and talk like the 
jurors.”  Id. at 612.  Without characteristics that “fit in” with the jury, he opines that juries will be 
suspicious of experts who possess even the best credentials and most apt analysis.  Id.  The most 
telling piece of advice Sease gives deals with scientific evidence and exposes his belief that not only 
are jurors biased, but also rather incompetent:  “Junk science is now in the courtroom, for good . . . .  
While people can argue whether this is good, it nevertheless is the law.  As the defendant’s trial 
counsel, use it.  Develop ‘scientific reasons’ why you should win.”  Id. at 621. 
  Sease makes no qualms about using dubious evidence to persuade what he evidently 
considers to be a gullible jury.  See id.  From this, it appears that the perception of incompetence 
leads to greater temptation to use “junk” evidence—after all, who will know the difference?  Id.  If 
lawyers considered jurors competent and perceptive, perhaps they would think twice before using 
ethically questionable evidence.  This shows the importance of perception over fact: even if juries 
are not, in fact, incompetent, the perception that they are may lead to practices that, like a self-
fulfilling prophecy, hinder their ability to properly adjudicate cases.  See id. 
 287.  See generally Elrod, supra note 19. 
 288.  Much existing literature is based on anecdotal evidence, see David J. F. Gross et al., You’re 
Still Killing Me: How to Prevent Your Expert Witness from Destroying Your Patent Case at Trial, in 
PATENT LITIGATION 2012, at 273, 293 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop., 
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a.  Arguments Against Competence 
The more popular position, it seems, is to denounce the jury as 
incompetent.289  In one rather doomsaying analysis, Roger W. Kirst wrote, 
“Because of the learning curve, the civil jury system probably could not be 
set up successfully in the United States today and could not be reinstituted if 
abandoned for even a short time.”290  A recent University of Cincinnati study 
showing that juror comprehension decreases as complexity increases 
bolstered Kirst’s position.291  Although scholars should logically expect an 
inverse correlation between comprehension and complexity, the study 
surprisingly showed that comprehension does not improve with higher levels 
of education or prior jury experience.292 
Critics also bemoan the jury’s inability to properly follow expert 
witnesses.293  The expert’s role is to translate complex subject matter into a 
readily understandable format for lay jurors.294  In theory, it seems 
reasonable to think that the most qualified experts would command the most 
respect from jurors.  This is not necessarily true in complex litigation.295  In 
one study, expert witnesses’ personal characteristics, like their credentials, 
became significant only when jurors had difficulty evaluating complex 
evidence.296  Other studies show that jurors are least trustful of the highest-
 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 34279, 2012), and “[t]he number of studies in this area is inadequate,” 
Keith Broyles, Note, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for Educating the Lay 
Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 723 (1996).  
 289.  See infra notes 294–302 and accompanying text. 
 290.  Kirst, supra note 132, at 38.  It seems that Kirst argues the jury has outlived its usefulness—
after all, if the jury could not be set up in the United States today, why bother keeping it?  The 
answer: the Seventh Amendment. 
 291.  Matthew A. Reiber & Jill D. Weinberg, The Complexity of Complexity: An Empirical Study 
of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 929 (2010). 
 292.  Id.  More studies need to be conducted in this regard.  At the very least, scholars need to 
ascertain the minimum amount of education that correlates with ability as a juror, because if juror 
comprehension does not correlate with education level at all, then comparing methods of teaching 
college students with methods of teaching juries may be moot.   
 293.  See Neil Vidmar, Expert Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH S137, S137 (2005) (“For a jury [expert testimony] is especially difficult, because its 
members usually have no competence in the area.  They are often left to make judgments largely on 
the basis of emotional appeals of the lawyers and their expert witnesses.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 294.  Gross et al., supra note 288, at 297 (citing BARRY L. GROSSMAN & GARY M. HOFFMAN, 
PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 1327 (2010)). 
 295.  See infra notes 296–98 and accompanying text.  
 296.  Gross et al., supra note 288, at 299 (quoting Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & Valerie P. Hans, 
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paid expert.297  The bottom line is that “charisma has an effect on jurors. . . .  
[D]uring patent cases that stretch on for weeks, witnesses with captivating 
personalities can wake up everyone in the courtroom and attract the jury’s 
attention.”298 
Technology’s impact on attention spans and information processing will 
likely bolster jury critics’ arguments.299  As traditional verbal education 
declines300 and the demand for constant entertainment increases,301 jurors 
likely will have an increasingly difficult time translating long hours of orally 
communicated complex material into understanding.302 
b.  The Other Side of the Story 
Others, however, have come to the defense of juries.303  First, jury 
supporters claim they rely on empirical studies more than their 
counterparts,304 whom they criticize for basing their assumptions on nothing 
more than their own elite biases.305  Even when subject matter becomes 
 
Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 441, 447 (2003)). 
 297.  Gross et al., supra note 288, at 299. 
 298.  Id.  Attracting the jury’s attention is an even greater concern in the technology age, in which 
attention spans are increasingly short.  See Carlson, supra note 181, at A36. 
 299.  See supra notes 189–200 and accompanying text. 
 300.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 301.  See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
 302.  See supra notes 186–200 and accompanying text. 
 303.  See infra notes 304–13 and accompanying text.  
 304.  For instance, federal judges who oversee juries have supported their capabilities.  “I 
emphatically reject the idea that ‘ordinary folks’ are not up to the task of judging complex cases . . . .  
[I]n my opinion, juries almost always get it right. . . .  [M]ost judges—those most familiar with jury 
trials—share my confidence in the jury.”  Elrod, supra note 19, at 320.  When polled, 96.5% of 
judges responded that juries award disproportionately high tort verdicts less than 10% of the time.  
Id.  This kind of empirical study is rare.  Because the jury deliberates in secret and is not compelled 
to discuss what happens in the “black box” of the jury room, see generally Moore, supra note 95, 
judge surveys are one of the few pieces of empirical evidence available to the academy. 
 305.  David Gross writes: 
The idea that jurors are not capable of comprehending complex issues, such as those 
presented by expert witnesses in patent cases, is a widespread misconception. . . .  
Criticisms about juror competence are based largely on anecdotal evidence, and those 
anecdotes are contradicted by empirical studies. . . .  [G]enerally speaking, jurors have 
taken the same number of science and math classes as federal district court judges. . . .  
Studies have shown that jurors are motivated to research a correct verdict, and will 
therefore attempt to evaluate expert testimony on its merits rather than relying on an 
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complex, lay juries “are usually capable of finding the facts and applying the 
law if judges make full use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”306  Second, some place the blame for any 
complexity problem on federal judges who expect juries “to play an 
impossible role” in disregard to the jury’s limited historical 
responsibilities.307  Third, proponents of traditional lay juries contend that 
expert witnesses are valuable assets to whom juries give proper attention308 
despite technology’s adverse effect on attention spans.309  Fourth, even if, 
arguendo, jurors might struggle with complex material,310 appellate 
affirmance rate comparisons between jury trials and bench trials demonstrate 
that judges are no better at patent adjudication than juries.311  Finally, 
proponents also caution that “[t]his sort of end-of-history approach is 
dubious . . . that we have reached a watershed and we have to throw 
everything aside and come in with new approaches.”312  They emphasize that 
 
expert’s credentials, likeability, or other peripheral factors. . . .  [J]urors appear to be up 
for the challenge.  Studies show that, even in complex trials, jurors comprehend and 
retain a significant amount of information from expert testimony. . . .  “[T]hey could 
usually comprehend enough of the testimony to engage in rational decision making.” 
Gross et al., supra note 288, at 293–94 (quoting Joe S. Cecil, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult 
Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 757 (1991)).  
 306.  Lisa S. Meyer, Note, Taking the “Complexity” Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the 
Constitutional Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1993) (emphasis added).  
For instance, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) should be used to bifurcate issues and avoid 
juror confusion.  Development in the Law, The Jury’s Capacity to Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (1997).  Again, the important point is whether the legal professionals are 
competently carrying out their duties.  Cf. supra notes 252–79 and accompanying text. 
 307.  Kirst, supra note 132, at 3.  This argument fits more squarely with holding courtroom 
professionals, and not once-in-a-lifetime jurors, responsible for any systematic inadequacies.  See 
Quigley, supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 308.  See Gross et al., supra note 288, at 296 (“[R]esearchers concluded that the jurors were 
indeed engaging in ‘central processing’ (which involves analysis of the substantive argument) rather 
than ‘peripheral processing’ (which involves mental shortcuts and reliance on factors tangential to 
the substantive argument).” (citing Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal with Expert 
Testimony and How Judges Can Help, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 54 (2007–2008))). 
 309.  See Carlson, supra note 187 and accompanying text.  
 310.  See supra notes 291–302 and accompanying text.  
 311.  Michael T. Nguyen, Note, The Myth of “Lucky” Patent Verdicts: Improving the Quality of 
Appellate Review by Incorporating Fuzzy Logic in Jury Verdicts, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1259 
(2008).  Juries seem to be getting damages right as well: they “award punitive damages at about the 
same rate” as judges, “and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory 
awards.”  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 779 (2002).  
 312.  See Carlson, supra note 181 (quoting Michael Gorman).  Perhaps we are not at a watershed, 
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juries are not “bewildered and unengaged during complex trials.  Rather, . . . 
jurors are hard-working and competent students, albeit somewhat skeptical 
of their expert teachers.”313 
Though there is ample room for debate on the topic, what little empirical 
data does exist supports jury competence.314  Appellate affirmance rates of 
both verdicts and punitive damage awards support the jury’s ability to “get it 
right.”315  Furthermore, academic critiques lack a firm foundation in fact.316  
Aside from juries being unduly influenced by expert witnesses’ peripheral 
factors,317 critics offer little other verifiable data.318  Many judges who 
comment on the issue support the continuing vitality of the lay jury.319  
Studies show that juries are not, in fact, less educated from the general 
population,320 and that even if they were, it would not impact competence.321  
In sum, the academy should presume juries are competent until proven 
otherwise, and critics simply have not proven their case.322  Instead, it seems 
that jurors take seriously their responsibility to fairly adjudicate cases, even 
if their outside lives are immersed in Tweets, bullet-point news, and 
multitasking.323 
2.  Advantages of Juries 
The jury was instituted because it offers several distinct advantages.  
First, the jury is a “powerful reminder of the basic democratic principle of 
American government.”324  The United States, often heralded as the pinnacle 
 
but at the very least, we must be willing to adapt to changing circumstances. 
 313.  Gross et al., supra note 288, at 296. 
 314.  See infra notes 315–23 and accompanying text. 
 315.  See Nguyen, supra note 311 and accompanying text.  
 316.  See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text. 
 317.  See Gross et al., supra note 288, at 299. 
 318.  See id. at 293–94.  
 319.  See generally, e.g., Elrod, supra note 304 and accompanying text.  But see Phil Hardberger, 
Juries Under Siege, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 4–13 (1998) (describing anti-jury sentiments of the 
modern Texas Supreme Court). 
 320.  See Levin & Emerson, supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 321.  Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 291, at 929. 
 322.  See supra notes 303–21 and accompanying text. 
 323.  See supra notes 314–21 and accompanying text. 
 324.  Kirst, supra note 132, at 28.  John Adams called the jury trial and popular elections “the 
heart and lungs of liberty.”  Elrod, supra note 19, at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Thomas Jefferson identified the jury “as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by 
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of modern democracy,325 allows its citizens to participate in civil government 
in more ways than simply voting.326  That their civic engagement also 
involves legal decisions of guilt, liability, and fault sets this country apart 
from nearly every other.327  Second, judges hear cases day in and day out, 
possibly fostering a bias and encouraging stereotypes.328  Jurors, many of 
whom presumably serve only once in their lives, do not suffer from these 
propensities.329  Third, jury trials allow our common law to develop in ways 
that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) does not.330  Judge Jennifer Elrod 
argues that the increase in ADR, and corresponding decrease in jury trials, 
deprives our common law of precedential development.331  None of these 
advantages has diminished to a level that warrants replacing the lay jury.  As 
long as democratic government, long-tenured judges, and a common law-
based judicial system exist, the lay jury remains vital.332  The legal 
profession must seek to strengthen it.333 
V.  IMPROVING LITIGATION BY LEGITIMATING THE JURY 
Though Americans are unique in their adherence to the jury system334 
 
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”  Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft saw the jury as not only central to democracy, but kept vital by the 
virtues of a democratic people . . . . 
Id. 
 325.  The United States is “the world’s leading and most powerful democracy . . . .”  Andrew 
Coleman & Jackson Maogoto, Democracy’s Global Quest: A Noble Crusade Wrapped in Dirty 
Reality?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 175, 201 (2005).  
 326.  See Lilly, supra note 86, at 54–56. 
 327.  See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also Elrod, supra note 19, at 306–07 (“The 
result of this skepticism [of jury competence] has been a steady trend away from the adoption of the 
jury abroad, leaving the United States almost alone in its adherence to the jury system.  . . .  Where 
the jury trial does exist, it exists in a form that is fundamentally different than the all-lay, binding, 
jury system that exists in the United States.”). 
 328.  See Kirst, supra note 132, at 28. 
 329.  Id.  But cf. supra note 286 (suggesting that jurors bring unique biases of their own). 
 330.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 324–25. 
 331.  Id. at 324 (“Arbitrations with no public record do not develop the law in any way.  The 
decisions of the arbitrators do not become precedent. . . .  Without cases, our common law will 
stagnate and the case law method of legal education will end.”). 
 332.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 322–25. 
 333.  See id. at 325 (asserting the jury can still be the “palladium of liberty in the United States” if 
the bench and bar undertake certain reforms). 
 334.  See supra notes 172, 327 and accompanying text. 
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(and show no signs of willingly abolishing it), their enthusiasm is waning.335  
One commentator put it this way: “The modern American jury has a bipolar 
presence in the popular consciousness.”336  On the one hand, we hear that the 
jury is a vital component in our democratic system.337  On the other, there are 
scores of academic critiques condemning the jury system as nothing more 
than an unpredictable roulette for litigants.338 
A.  Juries on the Decline 
The critics seem to be getting their way, at least in practical terms, 
because, even though litigation is on the increase, fewer disputes are 
reaching the jury.339  Jury trials are becoming “vanishingly rare”340 for 
several reasons.  First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have fostered a 
legal environment “in which litigants have found it not in their interests to 
exercise th[eir] right” to a jury trial.341  Second, Ashcroft v. Iqbal342 and Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly343 have made it more difficult to survive motions 
to dismiss, and cases that do survive are being increasingly resolved via 
summary judgment.344  Third, “businesses perceive jury trials as being 
 
 335.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 303 (“[T]he American jury system is under assault . . . .  [I]t is 
being used to settle disputes less and less, and . . . it has become commonplace to deride the very 
idea of the jury.  After all, why leave justice to the untrained public when almost every other trade 
has been the subject of increasing professionalism, when almost none of our global competitors have 
chosen the jury system for their own, and when our nation’s business leaders seem to have chosen 
alternatives to the jury system?”). 
 336.  Dooley, supra note 75, at 325. 
 337.  Justice Scalia called the criminal jury trial the “spinal column” of American democracy.  
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 338.  Both legal commentators and the general public are growing increasingly negative about the 
jury.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 317–18; see also supra notes 97–105 and accompanying text. 
 339.  See infra notes 340–46 and accompanying text.  
 340.  John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 
522, 524 (2012). 
 341.  Langbein, supra note 340, at 542.  Prior to the introduction of the Federal Rules, one-fifth of 
all civil cases went to trial.  Id. at 524.  Today, that number is below 2%.  Id. 
 342.  556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (requiring more than “bare assertions” in order to survive motions 
to dismiss).  
 343.  550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (increasing plaintiffs’ burden to survive motions to dismiss). 
 344.  Elrod, supra note 19, at 319.  These pre-trial motions are the meat and potatoes of today’s 
litigation.  As one Texas trial lawyer said, “‘Litigation is what lawyers do on the east coast to keep 
out of court.’”  Id. at 323. 
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unpredictable, slow, and costly,”345 which has led to “[p]rovisions for 
binding arbitration of disputes . . . [being] employed in virtually all kinds of 
contracts, making arbitration a wide-ranging surrogate for civil litigation.”346  
In sum, most cases simply are not reaching juries. 
B.  Suggestions Moving Forward 
The civil jury need not be abandoned, even though, in practicality, it 
seems to be.  As one recent article explained: 
[S]cholars should jettison measures to reduce or eliminate lay 
decisionmaking in civil cases and turn their attention instead to 
improvements in the trial process that increase the likelihood that 
lay jurors will understand the case and, as a result, reach more-
informed decisions.  This should include empirical studies of 
decisionmaking, both by individuals and groups, as well as the 
techniques currently used in the educational context that might be 
applied to the trial setting.347 
The Seventh Amendment still exists, and as long as it does, so will 
juries.348  Instead of bemoaning the current jury system and insisting it be 
composed only of the most educated citizens,349 the bench and bar should 
take steps to increase the lay jury’s legitimacy in the eyes of both the 
academy and the public.350  
A good start would be implementing several of Matthew Reiber and Jill 
Weinberg’s easy, rather noncontroversial suggestions.  First, judges should 
eliminate unnecessary confusion by allowing jurors to take notes.351  
Students are used to multitasking,352 and early concerns that note-taking 
 
 345.  Id. at 318. 
 346.  Id. at 319.  If corporations continue to increase their use of binding arbitration agreements—
which courts generally uphold, see, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011),—there will be less complex litigation and less reason to worry that juries are incapable of 
adjudicating it. 
 347.  Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 291, at 944. 
 348.  “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added). 
 349.  See, e.g., The Case for Special Juries, supra note 19. 
 350.  See Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 291, at 960–67. 
 351.  Id. at 965. 
 352.  See Carlson, supra note 181, at A36; see also supra notes 182–88 and accompanying text. 
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would distract jurors353 are increasingly unwarranted.  Second, instructing 
the jury at the beginning, middle, and end of trials would help keep jurors 
mindful of both what they should and should not be doing.354  Professors 
give their students syllabi on the first day of class; jurors should not have to 
wait until the end of trial for the judge to outline their task.  Third, complex 
trials would also profit from interim juror discussions and counsel 
summations.355  Today’s students spend much of their time in group-based 
discussion, yet today’s juries have no opportunity to learn from one another 
until deliberations.356  For particularly lengthy trials, giving counsel an 
opportunity to summarize what has and will happen, and then allowing intra 
jury discussion to clarify confusion, would properly focus the litigation and 
prevent early questions from translating into incompetent decision-making 
days or weeks later.357 
Next, and perhaps more controversially, courts should allow jurors to 
submit written questions to the judge as the trial progresses.358  As 
technology develops, jurors might even electronically submit questions in 
real time, which the judge could immediately evaluate.359  This would both 
streamline proceedings and allow the litigants to ensure that jurors 
understand witness testimony before they step down.360  On that note, those 
courtrooms that are not yet fully equipped with modern technology must get 
with the times.  Modern Americans “are used to technology and expect its 
use to help them understand difficult concepts.”361 
Attorneys must also adapt.  To compensate for a perceived shaky 
educational foundation362 and the misleading influence of litigation dramas 
on TV,363 it is essential for the bar to understand how today’s juries process 
 
 353.  See Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 291, at 965–66. 
 354.  See id. at 963; see also supra notes 256–61 and accompanying text. 
 355.  Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 291, at 966–67. 
 356.  See id. 
 357.  See id. at 966–67.   
 358.  Id. at 967. 
 359.  See Sonja Thompson, 10 Innovative Ways Businesses Are Using the iPad, TECHREPUBLIC 
(May 25, 2012, 3:12 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/tablets/10-innovative-ways-
businesses-are-using-the-ipad/1489 (describing increasingly diverse uses for the iPad).  There is no 
reason to stop such innovation at the courthouse door. 
 360.  See Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 291, at 967. 
 361.  Elrod, supra note 19, at 329–30. 
 362.  See Lilly, supra note 86, at 64; see also supra notes 93–105 and accompanying text.  
 363.  See supra notes 189–200 and accompanying text. 
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information and to adapt appropriately.364  One tool has remained constant 
over time: the expert witness.365  Juries continue to “depend on experts to 
explain complicated technical, scientific, financial, and legal issues.”366  
Since attorneys’ fundamental job is to educate the jury about the facts and 
law of their particular case,367 expert witnesses should view their jobs 
similarly.368  The best educators understand the characteristics of their 
students,369 and they should know of modern students’ affinity for 
technology.370  They should also know that though experts remain necessary, 
they are now insufficient.371  For instance, one tool that was unthinkable just 
decades ago, but is now essential,372 is the computerized display.373  Jurors 
are “almost uniformly in favor of computer animation in the courtroom.”374  
So, asks one commentator, “[W]hy do trial lawyers spend the majority of 
courtroom time teaching factfinders in a manner that burdens the auditory 
system and draws upon visual sensitivities to a far lesser degree?”375 
Finally, because there is no practical way to make media depictions of 
litigation true to life (imagine conforming TV shows to the Federal Rules of 
 
 364.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 329–30.  
 365.  Attorneys have long used experts to explain complicated concepts, such as patents, to juries.  
See, e.g., Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88 (1858). 
 366.  Gross et al., supra note 288, at 281. 
 367.  See Jaquish & Ware, supra note 226, at 1715. 
 368.  See supra note 294 and accompanying text.  
 369.  Jaquish & Ware, supra note 226, at 1720. 
 370.  See supra note 361 and accompanying text.  
 371.  See infra notes 373–75 and accompanying text.  
 372.  See supra note 361 and accompanying text.  
 373.  At the advent of the computerization of society, “people resisted computer technologies very 
strongly.”  Lori Reed, Domesticating the Personal Computer: The Mainstreaming of a New 
Technology and the Cultural Management of a Widespread Technophobia, 1964–, 17 CRITICAL 
STUD. MEDIA COMM. 159, 170 (2000), available at http://www.uky.edu/~addesa01/documents/Dom
esticatingthePersonalComputer.pdf; cf. infra note 374 and accompanying text.  “The last 25 years 
have seen great advances in the field of demonstrative evidence and its uses.  The next 25 years shall 
be at the very least equally exciting.”  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 73, at 878. 
 374.  Frank Herrera Jr. & Sonia M. Rodriguez, Courtroom Technology: Tools for Persuasion, 
TRIAL, May 1999, at 66, 68 (quoting John Selbak, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of 
Computer-Generated Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337, 359–60 (1994)). 
 375.  Jaquish & Ware, supra note 226, at 1721–22.  As Judge Elrod noted, jurors demand visual 
aids and technology, but lawyers must take care to incorporate them in the most fluid manner by 
playing short clips that both keep jurors’ attention and avoid preventable evidentiary objections.  
Elrod, supra note 19, at 329–30. 
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Evidence!), America must do a better job with civic education.376  Fewer 
than half of Americans can name the three branches of government, and only 
one-third of eighth graders can explain the original function of the 
Declaration of Independence.377  The United States can, and must, do better 
if the lay jury is to survive.378  Future education must build on the principles 
discussed above by incorporating interesting, informative, and engaging 
formats379—inevitably, this will involve up-to-date technology that students 
want to use.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has dedicated a great deal of 
effort to this end,380 publicly endorsing “a nonprofit organization called 
Games for Change, which created video games placing children in positions 
of decision-makers, like judges.”381  If American litigation were to abandon 
lay juries, there would be much less incentive to provide civic education—
there would be no point in teaching ordinary Americans about a system into 
which they would never be invited.382  Instead, we must encourage ordinary 
Americans to actively participate in both the classroom and the courtroom—
and give them the tools to do so.383  As Justice Breyer said, “pessimism is 
not the complete order of the day. . . .  Our democratic Constitution assumes 
a public that participates in the government that it creates.  It also assumes a 
public that understands how government works.”384 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Both technology and litigation are becoming increasingly complex,385 
and juries are becoming increasingly interconnected.386  In the courtroom, 
 
 376.  See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 219 (2010). 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  See infra notes 379–84 and accompanying text.  
 379.  Elrod, supra note 19, at 330. 
 380.  Id. 
 381.  TOOBIN, supra note 166, at 398. 
 382.  Recognizing the importance of the jury and its educational impact, Alexis de Tocqueville 
wrote, “I do not know whether a jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those 
who have to decide the case.  I regard it as one of the most effective means of popular education at 
society’s disposal.”  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1848). 
 383.  See supra notes 379–81 and accompanying text. 
 384.  BREYER, supra note 376, at 219–20. 
 385.  See supra notes 111–71 and accompanying text. 
 386.  See supra notes 111–30 and accompanying text. 
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gone are the days of homogenous, well-educated men listening to short oral 
arguments.387  Instead, attorneys are beginning to cater to diverse juries’ 
desire for technological instruction.388  Juries themselves are changing, both 
in their demographics and in the way they process information.389  This 
transformation is far from complete; indeed, scholars are unsure of what 
future education—and, by extension, litigation—will look like.390  The 
consensus is that traditional, lecture-based university education will likely 
decline as new modes of education, such as distance learning, sharply 
increase.391  All the while, jurors are becoming more and more dependent on 
ubiquitous technology that shortens their attention spans.392  Soon, the 
concept of sitting in a room for weeks listening to complex material could be 
a wholly foreign concept to the average American.393  Some might consider 
the jury doomed.394 
Fortunately, there is cause for hope.395  If attorneys can harness 
technology to present information to jurors in effective ways, and if jurors 
are willing and able to forego the momentary instant gratification of every 
new tweet and status update while they listen to the litigants, the American 
lay jury can survive.396  Legitimizing the jury, like all great American 
problems, is a holistic, collaborative endeavor.397  It requires cooperation 
from the academy, bench, bar, educators, and society at large.398  Though 
empirical studies are few,399 they do establish that juries are sufficiently 
educated, take their responsibilities seriously, and seem to arrive at the 
“correct” decision as frequently as judges do.400  Academic critiques—
 
 387.  See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 388.  See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 262–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 389.  See supra notes 172–203 and accompanying text. 
 390.  See supra notes 220–49 and accompanying text. 
 391.  See supra notes 242–49 and accompanying text. 
 392.  See supra notes 111–30 and accompanying text. 
 393.  See supra notes 242–49 and accompanying text. 
 394.  See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 395.  See BREYER, supra note 376, at 219–20; supra note 384 and accompanying text.  
 396.  See generally Lee, supra note 237. 
 397.  See Elrod, supra note 19, at 325 (“All of us—lawyers, courts, legislators, and litigants—can 
help.”). 
 398.  See id. 
 399.  See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 400.  See supra notes 306–11 and accompanying text. 
[Vol. 41: 817, 2014] Complex Litigation in the New Era of the iJury 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
859 
largely outdated in this new era—should not lessen America’s faith in its 
jury system that, so far, has lived up to its task.  Embracing technology and 
adapting to modern methods of communication will ensure that the jury 
system does so far into the future. 
Andrew J. Wilhelm* 
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